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IV. REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
This appeal arises from a summary judgment for Defendant Brent Overson 
("Overson"). Overson was, and still is, a Salt Lake County Commisioner, and this 
lawsuit arose out of a heated political debate related to the County's expenditure of 
public funds. In the Court below, Overson presented numerous compelling reasons 
why, as a matter of law, judgment should be granted in his favor. Overson's arguments 
were based on numerous defenses and privileges arising out of state constitutional, 
statutory and common law, as well as federal constitutional law. This appeal also 
presents procedural issues regarding motions under Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Defendant, Brent Overson, therefore respectfully requests oral argument. 
V. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court had jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2-2(j). The Utah Supreme Court properly transferred this appeal to the Utah 
Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4). Therefore, jurisdiction over 
this appeal is properly in the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-
2a-3(2)G). 
VI. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the district court correctly grant summary judgment in favor of 
Overson on the grounds that, because Overson's alleged statements arose in the 
context of a heated political debate, and because his statements were in response to 
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prior attacks by the plaintiff-appellant, the alleged statements were incapable of 
sustaining a defamatory meaning as a matter of law? 
a. When reviewing a district court's entry of summary judgment, the 
appellate court views the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party. Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 922 P.2d 745, 748 (Utah 1996). 
b. The appellate court reviews the district court's conclusions of law 
on summary judgment for correctness. ]d. 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion by declining to order additional 
discovery prior to ruling on Overson's Motion for Summary Judgment, when the plaintiff-
appellant had filed a Rule 56(f) Motion without a supporting memorandum and which 
failed to show (1) that discovery could establish a genuine issue of material fact, and (2) 
that any of the information he sought was in Overson's exclusive control? 
a. The grant or denial of a motion for additional discovery under Rule 
56(f), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, is committed to the sound discretion of the trial 
court judge and will only be reversed for abuse of that discretion. See Reeves v. Geiqy 
Pharmaceutical. Inc.. 764 P.2d 636, 639 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
3. Should this Court uphold the trial court's grant of summary judgment 
based on any of the alternative privileges and defenses raised in Overson's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and not specifically addressed by the trial court? 
a. An appellate court may affirm the trial court's decision on any 
proper ground, even if the trial court based its rulings on a different ground. See 
Embassy Group. Inc. v. Hatch. 865 P.2d 1366,1370 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
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VII. DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
Article I, Sections 1 and 15 of the Utah Constitution. 
U.S. Const. Amend. I. 
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 et. seq. 
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
West v. Thompson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999 (Utah 1994). 
VIII. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Background 
The defendant-appellee, Brent Overson (hereinafter "Overson"), is currently a 
Salt Lake County Commissioner, and has served as such since January of 1993. (R. at 
48.) As a member of the Salt Lake County Commission, Overson excersises both 
executive and legislative powers and duties. The County Commission ("Commission") 
has the power to purchase and convey, in the name of the county, any real or personal 
property deemed to be in the public interest. [Utah Code Ann. §17-5-242] The 
Commission has the power to enter into contracts with municipalities, local 
communities, other counties, and the State for the purpose of promoting development 
of county resources. [Utah Code Ann. § 17-5-270] The Commission has the further 
authority to expend county funds in a manner it deems advisable to carry out its duties. 
[Utah Code Ann. § 17-5-271] Finally, as a Commissioner, Overson has the right and 
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duty to perform "all other acts . . . which may be necessary to the full discharge of the 
duties of the board." [Utah Code Ann. § 17-5-244] 
South Mountain is a planned residential development in Draper, Utah. (R. at 38.) 
The plaintiff-appellant, David K. Mast (hereinafter "Mast"), is a Utah real estate 
developer. (R. at 38.) His company, U.S. General, Inc., is developing the Draper 
Heights Subdivision, a 123-unit development on 74 acres close to the South Mountain 
Development, (id-) Mast is in direct competition with South Mountain. (R. at 39.) 
An October 28, 1996 article in the Desert News reported that Mast has "publicly 
challenged the likes of the Utah Sports Authority, the Utah Transit Authority, Micron, 
Salt Lake County, the City of Draper, and even the National Basketball Association. (R. 
at 80.) The same article quoted Mast as saying: "I just feel I'm in a position that I can 
not only say something about an issue but I can do something about it. I have money. 
I can put ads in the papers. I can litigate if I have to." (id.) The ad referred to Mast as 
"the Lawsuit-man," and stated that Mast has lost track of how many lawsuits he's filed in 
his lifetime, (id.) 
Concerned Taxpayers of Utah ("CTU") purports to be a Utah nonprofit 
corporation. (R. at 40.) David K. Mast served as a director for Concerned Taxpayers of 
Utah during 1992 and 1993. (R. at 44-45.) On August 1, 1995, CTU was involuntarily 
dissolved or canceled. (R. at 46.) On March 28, 1996, CTU was reinstated as a Utah 
nonprofit corporation by Judy C. Mast, David Mast's wife. (R. at 46-47.) Mast was 
listed as the President of the reinstated corporation. (R. at 47.) 
Mast signed and filed a GRAMA request on behalf of Concerned Taxpayers of 
Utah, with respect to South Mountain, and was the County's personal contact with 
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regards to that request. (R. at 56-58.) In many letters to the County Commission and 
statements to the press, Mast spoke on behalf of CTU. (R. at 72, 73-75, 77.) Mast also 
admittedly funds most of CTU's endeavors himself. (R. at 81.) 
2. The Public Controversy Over the South Mountain Golf 
Course Acquisition Proposal 
On November 15, 1995, the Salt Lake County Parks and Recreation Citizen's 
Golf Advisory Board reviewed three proposals for development of golf courses in the 
south end of Salt Lake Valley. (R. at 94.) The three proposals included the Sharon 
Steel site in Midvale City, a Jordan River location in Sandy City, and the South 
Mountain course in Draper City. (R. at 94.) After discussion, the Golf Advisory Board 
voted unanimously in support of the County pursuing the South Mountain proposal. 
(Id.) 
The Salt Lake County Parks & Recreation Division conducted a formal 
evaluation of the merits of the South Mountain proposal and, on January 9, 1996, 
submitted its evaluation to the Salt Lake County Commissioners. (R. at 82-136.) The 
County's Project Evaluation called for the South Mountain Golf Course to be developed 
on a "turn-key" basis, meaning that the South Mountain developer would complete the 
course and then sell the finished course to Salt Lake County. (R. at 75,83.) 
The South Mountain acquisition proposal led to a public hearing which was held 
on Wednesday, April 17, 1996, at 12:00 p.m. in the Meadow Brook Golf Course 
clubhouse. (R. at 138.) Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 52-4-6, the County gave 
advance public notice of this meeting. (R. at 138-140.) 
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In early July of 1996, Salt Lake County made an offer of $6.5 million for the 
South Mountain Golf Course. (R. at 141.) The South Mountain developers offered $8 
million as their bottom price, (id.) The County refused to go any higher on its offer, and 
the negotiations temporarily halted, (jd.) Then, in late July, 1996, the County received 
information that South Mountain was entering an agreement to sell all or part of the golf 
course to a private developer. (R. at 144.) The County decided to reopen negotiations 
with South Mountain and eventually agreed on a purchase price of $7.9 million for the 
South Mountain Golf Course, (id.) 
At the end of September, 1996, the deal between Salt Lake County and South 
Mountain fell through. (R. at 153,155.) The South Mountain developers instead sold a 
half interest in their golf course to Crown Golf Properties of Chicago for $6 million. (Id.) 
While the South Mountain proposal was alive, it generated a great deal of public 
interest and debate. (R. at 72, 74, 138,141.) As early as January 3, 1996, news of the 
proposed acquisition had begun to reach the public, and people immediately began to 
express concerns and register their objections to the proposal with the Salt Lake 
County Commission. (R. at 156.) One of the most outspoken opponents of the 
proposal was David K. Mast. Mast sent several letters to the Salt Lake County 
Commissioners expressing his objections to the South Mountain project. (R. at 73-75, 
76-79, 158-171.) Mast was also quoted in several newspaper articles in which he 
openly and adamantly criticized the County's decision to purchase the South Mountain 
Golf Course. (R. 72-75, 172-173.) 
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3. Mast's GRAMA Request and the First "South Mountain" 
Lawsuit 
On March 6, 1996, David Mast filed a GRAMA records request with Salt Lake 
County in the name of the Concerned Taxpayers of Utah. (R. at 174-175.) Mast's 
request generally sought all documents related to the South Mountain acquisition 
proposal. (JcL) On March 7, 1996, the County sent Mast a Notice of Extended Time for 
Response to Records Request. (R. at 176.) The notice stated that Mast's request 
involved legal issues that required analysis by legal counsel, and set a response date 
for March 26, 1996. (Id.) 
Because Mast's request involved such a large number of records, it was 
necessary for the County to further extend its time for response. (R. at 58.) On March 
22, 1996, the County sent Mast a Notice of Extended time which set April 11, 1996, as 
the new date for the response to be completed. (]d.) 
On March 28, 1996, the Concerned Taxpayers of Utah sued Salt Lake County. 
(R. at 72.) The case was assigned to Judge Tyrone Medley of the Utah Third Judicial 
District Court. (R. at 48.) The Concerned Taxpayers of Utah was represented by 
attorney Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. (id.) On July 17, 1996, an Amended Verified Complaint 
was filed in that action naming Salt Lake County, Brent Overson, and John Does 1 to 
10 as defendants. (R. at 48.) The Amended Verified Complaint charged the County 
with unlawfully withholding some of the South Mountain documents that Mast had 
requested. (R. at 49-50.) It also alleged that Commissioner Overson had violated the 
Utah Open and Public Meetings Act by "on many occasions [meeting] with 
representatives of South Mountain in non-public locations . . . . " (R. at 51.) Finally, the 
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Amended Verified Complaint intimated to unethical behavior on the part of 
Commissioner Overson by stating: "Commissioner Brent Overson, in particular, 
appears committed to spending the money before the public can be informed. He has 
been seen on TV wearing South Mountain shirts, indicating his enthusiastic support for 
all the efforts of South Mountain." (R. at 51.) 
By April 11, 1996, Salt Lake County had given CTU nearly all of its documents 
related to the South Mountain acquisition proposal. (R. at 177-178.) Among those 
documents disclosed were the 1992 Campaign Finance Disclosure Statements for 
Commissioner Brent Overson. (]d.) 
On November 6, 1996, Third District Court Judge Tyrone E. Medley granted the 
County's Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint. (R. at 179-180.) 
4. Mast's Attacks Upon Overson's Character and 
Reputation 
During the heated debate over the South Mountain project, Mast did not restrict 
his public statements to mere disagreements over policy. Mast's comments included 
personal attacks on the character and reputation of Overson as well as repeated 
threats of legal action. Mast conducted these attacks through (1) letters sent to the 
County Commissioners and County Attorney, (2) charges of felony criminal behavior, 
and (3) repeated accusations of illegal and unethical conduct made in the news media. 
On February 22, ^996, Mast sent a letter to Overson regarding the South 
Mountain proposal. Mast stated that Overson had been seen on a local news program 
wearing a "South Mountain" golf shirt and expressed concern that Overson may have a 
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conflict of interest. (R. at 78.) Finally, Mast threatened a lawsuit "if you and your fellow 
commissioners want to perform without the best interest of the Utah taxpayer." (id.) 
The letter was also sent to County Commissioners Randy Horiuchi and Mary 
Callaghan. (id.) 
On February 26, 1996, Mast sent a letter to County Commissioner Randy 
Horiuchi. Mast stated "Like Commissioner Brent Overson, we are concerned that you 
may have (among other things) a conflict of in terest . . . . " (R. at 77.) This letter was 
also sent to County Commissioners Brent Overson and Mary Callaghan and County 
Attorney Douglas Short, (id.) 
On March 2, 1996, an article about the South Mountain proposal appeared in the 
Salt Lake Tribune. (R. at 74.) The article was titled "Leader of Taxpayers Group Says 
Golf Course Is A Rip-Off." In the article, Mast complained that the price to be paid by 
the County was exorbitant, negotiations were secret, and course construction should be 
put up for competitive bid. (id.) The article identified Mast as "a contractor who has 
worked on golf courses." (Id.) Mast also threatened a lawsuit if the South Mountain 
deal went through as planned, (id.) 
On March 4, 1996, Mast sent a letter to Overson with the March 2 article 
attached. The letter was also sent to Randy Horiuchi and Mary Callaghan, Salt Lake 
County Commissioners, and Douglas Short, Salt Lake County Attorney. (R. at 73.) 
The letter called upon Overson to schedule a public meeting to hear public comment on 
this issue and stated "[t]hat way at least, it will not appear as though you have 
something to hide." (id.) Once again, the article threatened a lawsuit if the County did 
not hold public meetings on the matter. 
9 
On March 15, 1996, David Mast sent another letter to Brent Overson. In the 
letter, Mast said that he was going to contact County Attorney Douglas Short to find out 
how much money was being budgeted for South Mountain. (R. at 159.) 
Mast stated: "If that amount for the golf course (including the maintenance facilities) 
exceeds 3 millions [sic] dollars, then we will be filing a lawsuit immediately." (Id.) 
On April 16, 1996, an article regarding the South Mountain proposal appeared in 
the Deseret News. (R. at 72.) The title of the article was "County may be sued over 
golf-course data." Of the commissioners, Mast charged "They're making a deal behind 
closed doors where it can't be scrutinized." (id.) 
On April 17, 1996, another article dealing with the South Mountain proposal was 
published in the Salt Lake Tribune. The article quoted Mast as saying that South 
Mountain's developers and the Salt Lake County Commission were engaged in a 
"sweetheart" deal. (R. at 182.) Mast also complained that his freedom of information 
requests were being "illegally thwarted." (R. at 182.) 
On Thursday, August 22, 1996, CTU placed a full page ad in the Deseret News. 
(R. at 184.) The bold-faced headline at the top of the ad stated: 
S. L. COUNTY COMMISSIONER, BRENT OVERSON MISLEADS THE PUBLIC 
AND CONTINUES TO VIOLATE STATE LAW! 
Below the headline, again in bold lettering, the ad stated: 
BRENT OVERSON HAS HAD MANY SECRET MEETINGS WITH SOUTH 
MOUNTAIN PRIVATE DEVELOPERS, TERRY DIEHL AND DEE 
CHRISTENSEN, BEHIND CLOSED DOORS! 
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The advertisement continued . . . 
BRENT OVERSON MISLEADS THE PUBLIC TO BELIEVE THAT THE 
COUNTY WILL OWN THE GOLF COURSE PROPERTY AND THAT 
PROPERTY IS INCLUDED IN THE $7.9 MILLION DOLLAR PURCHASE PRICE. 
And further down: 
BRENT OVERSON MISLEADS THE TAXPAYERS TO BELIEVE THE SOUTH 
MOUNTAIN COURSE WILL NOT BE SUBSIDIZED BY TAX DOLLARS AND 
WILL BE ENTIRELY FUNDED BY USER FEES. 
The ad also accused Overson of illegal conduct: 
BRENT OVERSON, IN OUR OPINION, HAS VIOLATED STATE LAW BY 
MEETING MANY TIMES, SECRETLY AND BEHIND CLOSED DOORS, WITH 
SOUTH MOUNTAIN DEVELOPERS. BRENT OVERSON FURTHER 
DISREGARDS STATE LAW AND REFUSES TO TURN OVER GOVERNMENT 
RECORDS. AS AN EXAMPLE: 
- DISCLOSURE STATEMENTS -CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS 
The ad finally stated: 
FOR THE PUBLIC'S INFORMATION, CONCERNED TAXPAYERS OF UTAH 
(CTU), HAS FILED SUIT AGAINST S. L COUNTY AND IT'S COUNTY 
COMMISSIONER, BRENT OVERSON, PERSONALLY 
Concerned Taxpayers of Utah also made formal allegations that Overson 
engaged in felony criminal conduct in connection with the South Mountain project. (R. 
at 185.) Mast himself even asked the Utah Attorney General's Office to convene a 
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grand jury to investigate Overson, and then published that fact in the Deseret News. 
(R. at 188.) 
5. The Reply to Mast's Attacks 
On August 26, 1996, a full-page ad appeared in the Desert News responding to 
the August 22, 1996 charges. (R. at 189.) The advertisement was entitled "The Salt 
Lake County Golf Program Presents the Facts." (|d.) The advertisement was signed by 
Lynn Davidson, County Parks Board Chair; Brent Overson, Salt Lake County 
Commissioner; Randy Horiuchi, Salt Lake County Commissioner; Tom Owen, County 
Golf Advisory Chair; Mary Callaghan, Salt Lake County Commissioner; and Elaine 
Redd, Mayor of Draper City, (jd.) Each one of the above persons duly authorized the 
use of his or her signature on the advertisement. (R. at 190-196.) The ad never once 
mentioned either CTU or David Mast. (R. at 189.) 
On the day that CTU's full page ad appeared in the Deseret News, Overson 
called a press conference. (R. at 197-198.) During the press conference, Overson 
read a prepared statement, (jd.) Overson called CTU's full page ad "politically 
motivated, mean spirited and a sham." (]d) Overson also made clear that David Mast 
was behind the CTU ad, and that Mast was a real estate developer and a competitor of 
South Mountain, (jd.) Finally, Overson stated that it was "a shame that a public official 
has to subject himself to threats, personal lawsuits, lies or character assassination." 
(Id.)1 
11n his brief, Mast states that Overson "admitted" various statements which were made at the press 
conference. However, Overson has only admitted those statements for the purpose of his Motion for 
Summary Judgment without waiving the right to challenge them at a later time if necessary. 
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On August 22, 1996, an article appeared in the Deseret News titled "Overson 
fires back at critics." (R. at 187.) The article itself reported that Overson had previously 
placed a full page ad in each of the Salt Lake Valley newspapers "vilifying" him for the 
South Mountain project. (]d.) The article then went on to reflect Commissioner 
Overson's purported reply to this ad, quoting Overson as saying "That ad is rife with 
misstatements and bare-faced lies." (jd.) The article further quoted Commissioner 
Overson as stating: "This is a competitor who is not happy with this transaction, this 
'Concerned Taxpayers of Utah' is a ruse. It's strictly a front for David Mast. It's a 
wonder anybody runs for public office when they have to be subject to this kind of 
harassment." (Jd..) 
A similar article appeared in the August 23, 1996 Salt Lake Tribune titled 
"Overson Lambasts Newspaper Ad." (R. at 199.) The ad quoted Overson as saying 
that CTU's previous full-page ad was "nothing more than a politically motivated, mean-
spirited sham." (jd.) The ad went on to state that David Mast is a real estate developer 
who is building a subdivision next to South Mountain, (jd.) 
B. NATURE OF THE CASE. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS. AND DISPOSITION 
IN COURT BELOW 
On November 8, 1996, Mast filed the Complaint in the instant action against 
Overson. (R. at 3.) The Complaint alleges that Overson defamed Mast when he 
responded to Mast's full-page ad by saying it contained "bare-faced lies" and by saying 
that Concerned Taxpayers of Utah was a "ruse." (R. at 1-3.) The Complaint also 
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contains claims based on the full-page ad titled "The Salt Lake County Golf Program 
Presents The Facts." (id.) 
On January 27, 1997, Overson field a Motion for Summary Judgment. 
(R. at 29-31.) Overson's Motion for Summary Judgment was based on several 
constitutional, statutory and common law privileges and defenses to defamation claims. 
Overson's Motion for Summary Judgment was filed along with a Memorandum In 
Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. at 215-256.), and the 
Affidavit of Terry Ellis in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. at 
32-214.) 
On February 10, 1997, Mast responded to the Motion for Summary Judgment by 
filing a Rule 56(f) Motion. (R. at 260-262.) Mast also filed the Affidavits of David K. 
Mast and Scott Simons in support of his Rule 56(f) Motion. (R. at 264-275.) Mast did 
not file a memorandum in support of his Rule 56(f) Motion and did not file any 
memorandum in opposition to Overson's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
On February 18, 1997, Overson filed a Motion to Strike Mast's Rule 56(f) Motion 
and Supporting Affidavits. (R. at 276-279.) Overson's Motion to Strike was based on 
the grounds that (1) Mast's Rule 56(f) Motion failed to comply with Rule 4-501 (1)(a), 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration, because it was not accompanied by a supporting 
memorandum of points and authorities; (2) Mast failed to meet his burden under Rule 
56(f) of demonstrating that additional discovery would create a genuine issue of 
material fact; and (3) Mast failed to demonstrate that the additional information he 
sought through discovery was in the exclusive control of Overson. (R. at 276-277.) 
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On February 18, 1997, Overson also filed a Reply Memorandum in Support of 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Strike Plaintiffs Rule 56(f) 
Motion and Supporting Affidavits. (R. at 285-300.) The Reply Memorandum reiterated 
the arguments outlined in Oversows Motion to Strike, and also argued that Overson 
was entitled to summary judgment because Mast never filed a memorandum in 
opposition to Oversows Motion and, therefore, all of the facts set forth in Overson's 
Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment were deemed admitted. (R. at 297-
298.) 
On June 9, 1997, a hearing was held before the Honorable Judge William 
Thome regarding Oversows Motion for Summary Judgment and related pleadings. (R. 
at 431.) 
On August 1, 1997, Judge Thome issued a Memorandum Decision on Overson's 
Motion for Summary Judgment and related pleadings (R. at 406-413.) Because of the 
clearly political context in which the allegedly defamatory statements occurred, Judge 
Thome granted summary judgment in favor of Overson on the ground that the 
statements could not sustain a defamatory meaning as a matter of law. ( R. at 411.) In 
a footnote, Judge Thome stated that Mast's Rule 56(f) Motion "does not require 
comment as the discovery is not required as the statement is not defamatory as a 
matter of law." (R. at 411.) 
IX. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court correctly granted Summary Judgment in favor of Overson on the 
ground that his alleged statements were incapable of sustaining a defamatory meaning 
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as a matter of law. Since Mast did not attempt to controvert any of Overson's material 
facts in support of summary judgment, Overson's facts are deemed admitted. 
Furthermore, the disputes that Mast attempts to manufacture from the record are 
irrelevant and immaterial to the basis for the trial court's grant of summary judgment 
and, therefore, do not rise to the level of genuine issues of material fact. Because of 
the fact that Overson's alleged statements arose in the context of a heated political 
debate regarding the expenditure of public funds, and because the statements were all 
made in response to prior attacks on Overson by Mast, the statements were, as a 
matter of law, incapable of sustaining a defamatory meaning. The trial court was, 
therefore, correct in granting summary judgment in favor of Overson. 
The trial court furthermore did not abuse its discretion in refusing to order 
additional discovery before ruling on Overson's Motion for Summary Judgment. Mast 
filed a bare-bones Rule 56(f) Motion without a supporting memorandum as required by 
the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. Mast's motion and affidavits failed to meet his 
burden under Rule 56(f), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to show that discovery could 
establish a genuine issue of material fact. Finally, Mast's Rule 56(f) Motion and 
supporting affidavits failed to demonstrate that any of the information he sought was in 
Overson's exclusive control. For these reasons, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in failing to order additional discovery prior to granting summary judgment for 
Overson. 
Even if it disagrees with the basis for the trial court's decision, this Court should 
affirm the grant of summary judgment based on any of the other privileges and 
defenses raised by Overson but not specifically addressed by the trial court. 
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Specifically, (1) Overson is entitled to absolute executive officer immunity; (2) Mast 
consented to the alleged defamation Overson; (3) Oversows statements are 
constitutionally protected as pure expressions of opinion; (4) Overson's statements are 
privileged as self-defense; (5) Overson's statements are privileged because they were 
made to protect his legitimate interests; (6) Overson's statements are privileged 
because they were made regarding matters of public interest; (7) Overson's statements 
are privileged under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution; and (8) Overson is 
immune from this suit pursuant to the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. On any one of 
these grounds, this Court should uphold the trial court's grant of summary judgment in 
favor of Overson. 
X. ARGUMENT 
A. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN 
FAVOR OF OVERSON ON THE GROUND THAT HIS ALLEGED 
STATEMENTS WERE INCAPABLE OF SUSTAINING A DEFAMATORY 
MEANING AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Under Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment should be 
rendered forthwith "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law." U.R.C.P. 56(c) (emphasis added). Summary judgment is not precluded 
simply whenever some fact remains in dispute, but only when a material fact is 
genuinely controverted. See Hegler Ranch, Inc. v. Stillman. 619 P.2d 1390 (Utah 
1980). 
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On appeal from a trial court's grant of summary judgment, the appellate court 
views the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and 
reviews the conclusions of law for correctness. Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 922 
P.2d 745, 748 (Utah 1996). 
While the factual context of this case is rich, the material uncontroverted and 
undisputed facts lead inexorably to the conclusion that the alleged statements made by 
Overson are incapable of sustaining a defamatory meaning as a matter of law. The trial 
court was, therefore, correct in granting summary judgment in favor of Overson. 
1. There is No Genuine Issue as to Any Material Fact 
Related to Whether the Alleged Statements Made by 
Overson are Capable of Sustaining a Defamatory 
Meaning, 
a. Mast did not at any time specifically controvert any of 
Overson's material facts in support of summary judgment and, 
therefore, all of Overson's material facts are deemed admitted. 
The Utah Code of Judicial Administration sets forth the requirements for 
responding to a motion for summary judgment. The code requires: 
All material facts set forth in the movant's statement and properly 
supported by accurate reference to the record shall be deemed 
admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless specifically 
controverted by the opposing party's statement. 
Rule 4-501 (2)(b), Utah Code of Judicial Administration (emphasis added). Under this 
rule, it is clear that a party must specifically respond to a Motion for Summary 
Judgment, and where a party fails to do so, the statement of facts of the moving party is 
deemed admitted. 
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In responding to Overson's Motion for Summary Judgment, Mast violated Rule 
4-501. The only pleadings that Mast ever filed in opposition to Overson's Motion were 
his 56(f) Motion, the Affidavit of David K. Mast, and the Affidavit of Scott Simons2." 
None of Mast's papers even attempted to controvert a single one of Overson's material 
facts. In light of this inexplicable failure, Overson's statement of facts is deemed 
admitted and there can, therefore, be no genuine dispute as to any material fact. 
b. The factual disputes that Mast attempts to 
manufacture from the record do not rise to the 
level of genuine issues of material fact. 
Realizing his complete and total failure to controvert any of Overson's material 
facts, Mast, in his opening brief, attempts to manufacture a few disputed issues of fact 
from within the record itself. Specifically, Mast mentions three areas which he claims 
involve disputed issues of fact: (1) the nature and capacity in which Overson was acting 
- official or private, (2) Overson's awareness of the difference between CTU and Mast, 
and (3) Overson's motivation for making his statements regarding Mast. [ See 
Appellant's Opening Brief on Appeal ("Mast's Brief), at pp. 7-10.] However, Mast's 
efforts in this regard are futile because, due to the fact that these disputes do not relate 
in any way to the legal ground on which the trial court based its decision, none of these 
insignificant points raise issues of material fact. 
Mast quotes select portions of the June 9 hearing transcript in support of his 
argument that there was a genuine factual dispute as to whether Overson was acting in 
2
 After the pleadings were closed, Mast also filed two documents that he termed "Supplements." (R. at 
332-337 and 374-387.) Judge Thome allowed the Supplements as part of the record. (R. at 414.) 
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an official or private capacity when he made the alleged statements about Mast. 
[Mast's Brief, at pp. 7-8.] However, this dialogue arose only in the context of a 
discussion between the trial court and Mr. Gurmankin regarding the executive officer 
privilege. It did not in any way relate to Oversows defense that his statements were 
incapable of sustaining a defamatory meaning as a matter of law. Indeed, Overson's 
capacity - official or private - has absolutely no bearing whatsoever on whether his 
statements are capable of sustaining a defamatory meaning, because that defense 
applies equally to all people regardless of whether they are governmental officials or 
private citizens. See West v. Thompson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1008 (Utah 1999). 
Therefore, this "dispute" cannot possibly be a genuine issue of material fact. 
Mast also extracts pieces from the June 9 transcript in an attempt to construct a 
factual issue regarding "the Commissioner's personal knowledge of the separate nature 
of Citizen Mast and C.T.U. and the motivation of the Commisioner to directly and 
indirectly imply false information regarding them." [Mast's Brief, at p. 8.] However, 
once again, this issue, if it exists at all, only goes to the question of whether Overson 
acted with malice. Indeed, the portions of the transcript quoted by Mast involved 
discussion about the qualified privileges raised by Overson of which malice, or the 
absence thereof, is a requirement. Malice, however, is not material to the defense of 
incapability of sustaining a defamatory meaning as a matter of law. See West, 872 
P.2d at 1008. Therefore, this dispute as well cannot raise a genuine issue of material 
fact with regards to the trial court's ground for granting summary judgment. 
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2. The District Court was Correct in Ruling that on the Uncontroverted 
Factual Record, Overson was Entitled to Judgment as a Matter of 
Law on the Ground that his Alleged Statements were Incapable of 
Sustaining a Defamatory Meaning. 
One of the essential elements of a defamation case in Utah is that the 
statements made by the defendant be actually defamatory. West, 872 P.2d at 1007-
1008. Whether a statement is capable of sustaining a defamatory meaning is a 
question of law to be properly determined by the court. id. The guiding principle for the 
court in making this determination is the statement's tendency to injure a reputation in 
the eyes of its audience. ]d. A court cannot make this legal determination by viewing 
individual words in isolation, but rather must carefully examine the context in which the 
statement was made, giving the words their most common and accepted meaning, id. 
In West v. Thompson Newspapers, the Utah Supreme Court held that, when 
taken in context, the word "manipulate" was not capable of sustaining a defamatory 
meaning. See, id., 872 P.2d at 1011. The Court based its decision heavily upon the 
fact that the statement appeared in a newspaper editorial column where such 
"exaggerated commentary" was expected by readers, and it was unlikely that any 
reader would take such a statement at its face value in this context, id. at 1010. 
In the case at hand, the trial court was correct in reaching the same conclusion 
as the Utah Supreme Court in West. The trial court correctly noted that "[t]he 
statements of both parties revolved around Salt Lake County's purchase of the South 
Mountain Golf Course," and that "[t]he statements of the defendant were a piece of a 
puzzle framed by politics, public spending, and an upcoming election." (R. at 409-411.) 
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Indeed, even CTU's own court papers recognize that the South Mountain debate was a 
"controversial matter" of great public import. (R. at 51-52.) Mast had previously made 
numerous attacks upon Oversows character and reputation and published those 
attacks in the press. The public would certainly expect Overson to respond to the 
attacks and, in this context, such a response would not be considered defamatory. The 
mere fact that Overson strongly responded to Mast's attacks does not suffice to create 
defamation. As the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
A publication is not defamatory simply because it is nettlesome or 
embarrassing to a plaintiff, or even because it makes a false statement 
about the plaintiff... [the plaintiff] must establish that the statement was 
more than sharp criticism . . . he must establish that it damaged his 
reputation . . . in the eyes of at least a substantial and respectable 
minority of its audience. 
West, 872 P.2d at 1009. Given the context of Oversows alleged statements, Mast 
could not possibly establish that the statements damaged his reputation in the manner 
required by West. 
In his appellate brief, Mast makes the argument for the first time that Oversows 
alleged statements that Mast was using "the deceptive name of Concerned Taxpayers 
of Utah," or that the CTU was a "ruse," amounted to nothing less than an allegation that 
he was engaging in criminal conduct. [Mast's Brief, at pp. 10-14.] One can only 
assume that Mast made this argument for the first time on appeal because he could not 
make it with a straight face in the hearing before Judge Thome. The argument is 
ludicrous and demonstrates Mast's desperation to stretch the facts of this political 
debate into a cause of action for defamation. Indeed, Mast's argument flies directly in 
the face of the Supreme Court's ruling in West. In that case, the court dealt with a 
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newspaper editorial that accused a city mayor of attempting to "manipulate the press." 
The statement in West could just as easily have been stretched into some form of 
ambiguous implication of criminal conduct - for example, bribery or blackmail. However, 
the court quoted the case of DiBemardo v. Tonawanda Publishing Corp.. 117 A.D.2d 
1009, 199 N.Y.S.2d 553 (1986), for the proposition that "absent a clear assertion of 
criminality, accusations of [using] political influence to obtain a benefit are not 
defamatory." West, 872 P.2d at 1010 (emphasis added). The Court then went on to 
hold that there was no clear allegation that attempting to manipulate the press is 
criminal or even ethically improper conduct, and that "[t]his combined with the general 
context in which the statement appears, convinces us that the manipulation statement 
could not have damaged West's reputation." See West,872 P.2d at 1010-1011. 
Because of its tenuous nature and the clear authority to the contrary, Mast's newly 
invented argument does not support an overturning of the trial court's decision. 
Mast also makes the disingenous argument that Judge Thome did not consider 
all of the evidence before him of Overson's alleged defamatory statements. Mast refers 
to the written copy of Overson's prepared press conference statement found at pages 
197 and 198 of the record and specifically to Overson's alleged statement that David 
Mast was using "the deceptive name of Concerned Taxpayers of Utah" or" whatever 
[he] called [him]self." [Mast's Brief, at p.5.] However, even a cursory reading of the 
summary judgment hearing transcript makes it clear that Judge Thome was entirely 
aware of the contents of Overson's press conference. (R. at 462-64, 467-74.) In fact, 
Mr. Snuffer, Mast's counsel, expressly pointed out the prepared press conference 
statement to Judge Thorne and walked him through it item-by-item. (R.a 1467-74.) 
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There is no question that Judge Thorne considered the press conference in reaching 
his decision to grant summary judgment. The mere fact that in his Memorandum 
Decision Judge Thorne chose to focus more heavily on how the press conference 
statements were subsequently reported in the newspapers cannot constitute reversible 
error. This is especially true when the newspaper articles that were expressly 
discussed by Judge Thorne contained language very similar to, and equally as strong 
as, the language in Oversows prepared press conference statement. (R. at 187-188.) 
Given all of the surrounding circumstances of this case, and the context in which 
Overson's alleged statements were made, as fully documented in the record and 
carefully considered by Judge Thorne below, it is clear that the trial court was correct in 
holding that Overson's statements did not, and as a matter of law could not, damage 
Mast's reputation. Indeed, the fact that Overson's statements were made in reply to 
Mast's previous attack is, by itself, enough to make these statements non-defamatory 
as a matter of law. See Fram v. Yellow Cab Co. of Pittsburgh, 380 F. Supp. 1314, 1330 
(W.D. Pa. 1974). The trial court correctly found that there was simply no defamation in 
this case. 
B. THE TRIAL DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO ORDER 
FURTHER DISCOVERY BEFORE RULING ON OVERSON'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Mast repeatedly argues in his brief that the trial court should have granted his 
Rule 56(f) Motion and stayed a ruling on summary judgment until he had been given 
the opportunity to conduct more discovery. [Mast's Brief, at pp. 4-6,10-12 and 18.] 
Although Judge Thorne did not expressly deny Mast's Rule 56(f) Motion, his action in 
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granting Overson's Motion for Summary Judgment without ordering further discovery 
had the practical effect of a denial. 
The grant or denial of a motion for additional discovery under Rule 56(f), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court judge 
and will only be reversed on appeal for abuse of said discretion. See Reeves v. Geiqy 
Pharmaceutical Inc.. 764 P.2d 636, 639 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
1. Mast's Rule 56(f) Motion was Filed Without a Supporting 
Memorandum in Violation of the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration. 
Rule 4-501 (1)(a), Utah Code of Judicial Administration, unambiguously requires 
that "[a]ll motions, except uncontested or ex parte matters, shall be accompanied by a 
memorandum of points and authorities . . . .M Mast's Rule 56(f) Motion in this case was 
filed without a supporting memorandum of points and authorities. The trial court was, 
therefore, justified in not granting Mast's Rule 56(f) Motion. 
2. Mast Failed to Meet His Burden Under Rule 56(f), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, to Show that Discovery Could Establish a Genuine Issue 
of Material Fact. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has stated that the movant making a Rule 56(f) 
motion must explain how the continuance will aid in his opposition to summary 
judgment. Callioux v. Progressive Ins. Co.. 745 P.2d 838, 841 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). In 
explanation, "the party opposing the motion must present facts in proper form. . . [a]nd 
the opposing party's facts must be material and of a substantial nature." ]d. (quoting 6 
J. Moore, W. Taggart & J. Wicker, Moore's Federal Practice fl 56.15[3] (2d ed. 1987)). 
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Therefore, in order to prevail on his Rule 56(f) Motion, Mast had the burden of showing 
that a continuance and additional discovery would assist him in establishing a genuine 
issue of material fact. Id. Mere conclusory allegations that additional discovery is 
expected to produce matters essential to opposition of summary judgment "smacks of a 
'fishing expedition1 for purely speculative facts," and courts will not grant a Rule 56(f) 
motion based on such conclusory statements. See, Callioux, 745 P.2d at 841. Instead, 
the party filing a Rule 56(f) motion is required to specifically show that the information 
sought is relevant, material, and how such facts will be useful in opposing the Motion 
for Summary Judgment. See, Jensen v. Redevelopment Agency of Sandy City. 998 
F.2d 1550, 1554-55 (10th Cir. 1993). 
a. Mast did not Satisfy His Burden of Specifically Showing how a 
Continuance and Additional Discovery Could Assist Him in 
Opposing Summary Judgment by Creating a Genuine Issue of 
Material Fact. 
Mast's Rule 56(f) Motion and supporting affidavits contained nothing more than 
conclusory allegations that a stay and additional discovery would assist him in opposing 
summary judgment. It is clear that the Rule 56(f) Motion was nothing more than an 
attempt to launch a "fishing expedition" designed to harass and annoy Mr. Overson 
rather than uncover information that would create a genuine issue of material fact. 
Mast did not even try to satisfy his burden under Utah law, and the trial court, therefore, 
did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion. 
In his Rule 56(f) Motion, Mast made the bald allegation that he "does not have in 
his possession, and cannot obtain without discovery, a copy of the tape recorded and 
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video taped [sic] news conference conducted by the Defendant in which he made 
disparaging and false comments about the Plaintiff." (R. at 260.) Mast made 
absolutely no effort whatsoever to show how these items would create a genuine issue 
of material fact or otherwise assist him in opposing summary judgment. Mast also 
stated that he "cannot, without the conduct of discovery, fully challenge the allegations 
of the Defendant that this was a 'privileged' communication." []d.] It is difficult to 
imagine a more conclusory and speculative statement in support of a Rule 56(f) Motion. 
To allow such a motion to succeed would not only have gone directly against the Utah 
Court of Appeal's command in Callioux, but it would have rendered absolutely 
meaningless any requirement that a Rule 56(f) movant specifically identify how 
additional discovery would raise a genuine issue of material fact. 
Mast's supporting affidavits provided no more specificity than his Rule 56(f) 
Motion. In his affidavit, Mast made such bald conclusory allegations as: "I need to take 
the deposition of Mr. Overson in order to oppose his allegation that the statements he 
made were in 'self defense'." (R. at 266.) As another example, Mast stated: "The 
deposition of Mr. Overson and the audio and video tapes are essential in order to allow 
me to develop specific attacks on all of the alleged defenses of Mr. Overson." (R. at 
266.) Once again, it is difficult to imagine more conclusory and speculative allegations 
in support of a Rule 56(f) Motion. These allegations simply cannot satisfy Mast's 
burden under Utah law. See, Callioux, 745 P.2d at 841-842. 
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b. Through his Rule 56(f) Motion, Mast sought Discovery of 
Information that is Irrelevant and Immaterial and Thus Could 
not Have Possibly Assisted Him in Opposing Summary 
Judgment. 
In his affidavit, Mast made the following statement with regards to why additional 
discovery was necessary: 
I questioned [sic] the claim of Mr. Overson that he was acting under a 
qualified "privilege" and that he deserves to have "immunity." I need to 
take the deposition of Mr. Overson to challenge those claims, and 
believe that if I am permitted to take his deposition I will be successfully 
able to do so. 
(R. at 265-266.) Mast also made the blanket claim that the deposition of Mr. Overson 
was necessary "to allow me to develop specific attacks on all of the alleged defenses of 
Mr. Overson." (R. at 266.) Futhermore, during the June 9 hearing before Judge 
Thome, counsel for Mast stated that "I believe that - - that the deposition of Mr. 
Overson himself is potentially dispositive of all of their defense." (R. at 444.) 
The fact of the matter is that Mast could have obtained no information by 
deposing Mr. Overson which would have allowed him to defeat any of the privileges 
and defenses raised in Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Any additional 
discovery would have therefore been irrelevant and immaterial, and its only effect would 
have been to harass and annoy Mr. Overson. 
The defense which the trial court relied on in granting the Overson's Motion was 
that all of Overson's statements are incapable of sustaining a defamatory meaning as a 
matter of law. Whether a statement is capable of sustaining a defamatory meaning is 
an objective determination made by the court by examining the statement in the context 
in which it is made. See, West v. Thompson Newspapers. 872 P.2d 999, 1008 (Utah 
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1994). The key question for the court is whether a statement tends to injure the 
plaintiffs reputation in the eyes of its audience. ]d. Oversows personal motivations are 
not relevant to this issue. How then could the deposition of Mr. Overson have provided 
any information whatsoever that would have been relevant to this determination? The 
truth of the matter is that it could not. All that the trial court needed to make this 
determination were the alleged defamatory statements and the context in which they 
were made. This information was amply supplied by the pleadings and affidavits 
already submitted. The deposition of Mr. Overson could have provided nothing more. 
3. The Plaintiffs Rule 56(f) Motion and Supporting Affidavits Failed to 
Show that any of the Information He Sought was in the Exclusive 
Control of Overson. 
In his brief, Mast argues that the trial court should have allowed additional 
discovery so that Mast could attempt to gain access to the full text of Oversows press 
conference including the ways in which Oversows statements were reported in the 
media. [Mast's Brief, at p. 6.] However, because this information is not, and never has 
been, in Overson's possession, let alone his exclusive control, Mast's argument must 
fail. 
In describing the Rule 56(f) standard, the Utah Court of Appeals has stated: 
The mere averment of exclusive knowledge or control of the facts by the 
moving party is not adequate: the opposing party must show to the 
best of his ability what facts are within the movant's exclusive 
knowledge or control; what steps have been taken to obtain the desired 
information pursuant to discovery procedures under the Rules; and that 
he is desirous of taking advantage of these discovery procedures. 
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Callioux v. Progressive Ins. Co., 745 P.2d 838, 840-841 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) 
(emphasis added). In order to prevail on his Rule 56(f) Motion, Mast must show that 
the facts he seeks are in the exclusive control of Overson. jd. Rule 56(f) cannot be 
used to obtain additional time to discover information that is publicly available or was 
already available to Mast prior to the time that Overson filed his Motion for Summary 
Judgment. See, Sage Realty Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 34 F.3d 124, 
128 (2d Cir. 1994). 
Mast based his Rule 56(f) Motion in part on the fact that he "does not have in his 
possession, and cannot obtain without discovery, a copy of the tape recorded and 
videotaped news conference conducted by the Defendant in which he made 
disparaging and false comments about the Plaintiff." (R. at 260.) Mast himself admitted 
that these tapes were not in the exclusive control of Overson. In his Affidavit, Mast 
stated: "The full text of [Overson's] statement was recorded by various newspaper, 
radio, and television outlets within the valley." (R. at 265.) These tapes were clearly 
available through means other than discovery upon Overson. In fact, Overson's office 
does not have any tapes or other recordings of the news conference in their 
possession. (R. at 313-314.) 
Mast further alleged: "I have not been able to obtain, and will not be able to 
obtain without discovery, copies of the way in which this news conference was 
subsequently reported on radio and television." (R. at 265.) Clearly, the contents of 
radio and television reports were not in the exclusive control of Overson and, in fact, 
Overson's office does not have the contents of such reports. (R. at 313-314.) 
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Furthermore, through his Rule 56(f) Motion, Mast was attempting to discover the 
actual defamatory statements that he alleges Overson made. For example, in his Rule 
56(f) Motion, Mast stated that he "does not have in his possession, and cannot obtain 
without discovery, a copy of the tape recorded and video taped [sic] news conference 
conducted by Defendant in which he made disparaging and false comments about the 
Plaintiff." (R. at 260.) Mast reasserts this same argument in his appellate brief. [Mast's 
Brief, at p. 6.] However, this is information that Mast should have had in his possession 
before he even filed his Complaint. If Mast did not even know what was said by 
Overson, this raises serious questions about (1) whether Oversows statements were 
even published, and (2) whether the plaintiff did a sufficient investigation of the facts, as 
required by Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 11, before he filed his Complaint. 
Because the information he seeks could have been easily obtained by means 
other than discovery upon Brent Overson, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying Mast's Rule 56(f) Motion. 
C. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THIS COURT SHOULD UPHOLD THE TRIAL 
COURT'S GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY RELYING ON ANY 
ONE OF THE OTHER DEFENSES AND PRIVILEGES RAISED BY 
OVERSON IN HIS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Utah law is clear that an appellate court may affirm the trial court's decision on 
any proper ground, even if the trial court based its rulings on a different ground. See 
Embassy Group, Inc v. Hatch, 865 P.2d 1366, 1370 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). In his Motion 
for Summary Judgment, Overson raised a total of nine (9) defenses and privileges. (R. 
at 29-30.) Judge Thorne granted Oversows motion based solely on the ground that 
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Overson's alleged statements were incapable of sustaining a defamatory meaning as a 
matter of law - Overson's first defense. However, since there are no genuine issues as 
to any material fact and Overson is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all of his 
defenses, this Court can uphold the trial court's grant of summary judgment based on 
any of the privileges and defenses raised by Overson if it so chooses. See Embassy 
Group, 865 P.2d at 1370. 
1. The Court Should Uphold the Trial Court's Grant of Summary 
Judgment Because Overson has Absolute Executive Immunity from 
this Suit. 
The common law recognizes an absolute privilege for state and local executive 
officers who publish defamatory matter in the course of performing their executive 
duties. See, Fender v. City of Oregon City. 811 F. Supp. 554, 558 (D. Or. 1993), affd, 
37 F.3d 1505 (9th Cir. 1994); Schroeder v. Poaqe. 707 P.2d 1240, 1242-1243 (Or. Ct. 
App. 1985); Kurat v. County of Nassau. 264 N.Y.S.2d 126, 128 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1965); 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 591 (1977). This privilege extends to statements 
made by the executive to the news media. See, Fender, 811 F. Supp. at 558; 
Schroeder 707 P.2d at 1243. The privilege also extends to statements made by 
county executive officers. Kurat. 264 N.Y.S.2d at 128. Because the privilege is 
absolute, no action for defamation can be maintained against the executive officer 
regardless of any alleged malice or other improper purpose. See. Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 591 comment d (1977); Schroeder, 707 P.2d at 1243 ("because the 
privilege is absolute, Defendant's purpose in publishing the letter is irrelevant"). 
Therefore, because Overson published the alleged defamatory statements in the 
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course of performing his duties as a county executive official, there can be no recovery 
by the plaintiff as a matter of law. 
It is unquestionable that any alleged defamatory statements were made by 
Commissioner Overson in the course of performing his executive duties. The Salt Lake 
County Commission acts as the legislative body for the County, and also in various of 
its duties acts as the executive in administering County affairs. Cottonwood City 
Electors v. Salt Lake County Board of Commissioners, 499 P.2d 270, 271 (Utah 1972). 
Therefore, Overson functions as both a legislative and executive official of Salt Lake 
County. The South Mountain project directly involved numerous branches of the Salt 
Lake County Government. It likewise involved the Commissioners1 legislative and 
executive duties to acquire real estate, enter contracts, and spend County funds. See, 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 17-5-242, 17-5-270, and 17-5-271. Mast's initial attacks were made 
directly against Oversows performance on the South Mountain project, and accused 
Overson and the Commission of illegal and unethical behavior when acting as County 
Commissioner. Oversows responses were aimed directly at refuting these attacks and 
ensuring the public that there was no impropriety concerning the South Mountain 
project. These limited statements to the press were clearly within the scope of 
Oversows executive duties. See, Fender, 811 F. Supp. at 558; Schroeder, 707 P.2d at 
1243. 
Overson is clearly entitled to absolute executive immunity for the alleged 
defamatory statements. Therefore, this Court should uphold the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment. 
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2. The Court Should Uphold the Trial Court's Grant of 
Summary Judgment because Overson's Statements are 
Absolutely Privileged Due to the Fact that Mast 
Consented to their Publication. 
Cases have consistently held that consent is an absolute defense or privilege to 
a defamation action. See, Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556, 561 n. 4 (Utah 1988); Rover v. 
Steinberg, 153 Cal. Rptr. 499, 503 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979); Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§ 583 (1977); David A. Elder, Defamation: A Lawyer's Guide § 2:2 at 2-3 (1993). Since 
it is an absolute privilege, the defendant is absolved totally of liability, and the Plaintiff is 
precluded from attempting to circumvent the defense by alleging malice or falsity. 
Rover, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 504; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 583 comment f at 242 
(1977); Defamation: A Lawyer's Guide § 2:2 at 3. The consent given by the Plaintiff 
does not have to be express, but can rather be shown by "words or conduct.. . 
reasonably understood to be intended as consent. . ." Defamation: A Lawyer's Guide § 
2:2 at 5. 
The Rover case dealt with a discharged plaintiff who had publicly challenged his 
former employer to "prove" the truth of the charges leading to his dismissal. The court 
held that this challenge "constituted nothing less than a request for the publication of 
the evidence upon which [the employer] based their charges." Rover. 153 Cal. Rptr. at 
503. The Court held that since the plaintiff impliedly consented to the subsequent 
publication by the defendant, the statements were absolutely privileged, and the plaintiff 
could not maintain his action. In the case at hand, Mast's prior public attacks upon 
Overson amounted to nothing less than a public challenge. Mast continually called for 
public debate over the South Mountain acquisition issue. Furthermore, when Mast 
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publicly accused Overson of illegal and unethical conduct, he had to fully expect that 
Overson would respond in order to protect his reputation. Because he impliedly 
consented to the measured reply by Commissioner Overson, the Plaintiff cannot now 
come to the Court claiming defamation. As one court stated: "[a] man who commences 
a newspaper war cannot subsequently come to the court as plaintiff to complain that he 
has had the worst of the fray." Havcox v. Dunn, 104 S.E.2d 800, 812 (Va. 1958). 
The policy behind the consent privilege applies with strong force to the facts of 
this case. The primary function of the consent defense is to prevent a plaintiff from 
"creating" a libelous publication by inviting or inducing indiscretion and thereby laying 
the foundation of a lawsuit for his own pecuniary gain. See, Defamation: A Lawyers 
Guide § 2:2 at 5. Allowing plaintiffs like Mast to recover for defamation would 
encourage people to intentionally attack another and then sue for defamation when that 
person defends himself. This is the exact situation the consent privilege was created to 
avoid. This Court should, therefore, uphold the trial Court's grant of summary 
judgment. 
3. This Court Should Uphold the Trial Court's Grant of Summary 
Judgment Because Overson's Alleged Defamatory Statements were 
an Expression of Pure Opinion Absolutely Protected by the Utah 
Constitution. 
Article I, Section 15, of the Utah Constitution provides, in part, "No law shall be 
passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of speech or of the press." As the Utah 
Supreme Court has noted, "expressions of opinion are the mainstay of vigorous public 
debate. Without opinion, such debate is virtually non-existent." West v. Thompson 
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Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1014 (Utah 1994). The court went on to state that 
"[b]ecause expressions of pure opinion fuel the marketplace of ideas, and because 
such expressions are incapable of being verified, they cannot serve as a basis for 
defamation liability." ]d. at 1015. Thus, Article I, Sections 1 and 15, of the Utah 
Constitution protect expressions of opinion, id. That protection can only be lost when 
the opinion states or implies facts that are false and defamatory, id. 
a. The Alleged Defamatory Statements are Pure Expressions of 
Opinion Which are Constitutionally Protected. 
The following factors are used by the court in distinguishing statements of 
actionable fact from non-actionable opinion: (1) the common usage or meaning of the 
words used; (2) whether the statement is capable of being objectively verified as true or 
false; (3) the full context of the statement - for example the entire article or column - in 
which the defamatory statement is made; and (4) the broader setting in which the 
statement appears. West, 872 P.2d at 1018. Applying these criteria, it is absolutely 
clear that the alleged defamatory statements are actually statements of pure non-
actionable opinion. 
In this case, the latter two factors are the most compelling. When one looks at 
the third factor - the full context of the statements - the statements are clearly opinion. 
Commissioner Overson's remarks in the newspaper articles are clearly made in an 
attempt to defend himself. Even the titles of the two articles suggest that these 
statements are a defensive response rather than a direct attack on Mast and the CTU. 
(R. at 187-188, and 199.) When viewed in this defensive context, it must be absolutely 
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clear to any reasonable reader that Oversows statements are opinion. This becomes 
even more clear in light of the fourth factor - the broader setting in which these 
statements were made. It is crucial to remember that this entire incident arises directly 
out of a hotly contested and openly debated political issue. The Utah Supreme Court 
has recognized that "[suppression of speech in this context is always subject to 
exacting constitutional scrutiny." West. 872 P.2d at 1019. As the court stated: "By 
entering the political arena, [the plaintiff] exposed himself to pointed, harsh, and even 
defamatory criticism expressed in the form of opinion. Such expression of opinion must 
be permitted in the arena of political debate." West. 872 P.2d at 1020. 
This Court should, therefore, uphold the trial court's grant of summary judgment 
in favor of Overson. 
4. The Court Should Uphold the Trial Court's Grant of 
Summary Judgment Because Any Alleged Defamatory 
Statement was Made by Overson in Self-Defense and is 
Thus Privileged as a Matter of Law. 
a. As a Matter of Law, the Qualified Privilege of Self Defense 
Extends to All of the Alleged Defamatory Statements Made by 
Overson. 
When a person is attacked in the press, he or she has a qualified privilege to 
respond in kind, and any statement so made, even if defamatory, is not actionable so 
long as he or she does not respond with malice or excessive publication. See, Gregory 
v. Durham Co. Board of Education, 591 F. Supp. 145, 156-157 (M.D.N C. 1984); Phifer 
v. Foe, 443 P.2d 870, 871-872 (Wyo. 1968); Rodriguez-Erdmann v. Ravenswood 
Hospital Medical Center. 545 N.E.2d 979, 984-985 (III. Ct. App. 1989); Restatement 
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(Second) of Torts § 594 comment K at 267 (1977); W. Page Keeton et. al., Prosser and 
Keeton on The Law of Torts $ 115 at 825 (5th ed. 1984); see also Havcox v. Dunn, 104 
S.E.2d 800, 810-813 (Va. 1958) ("A man who commences a newspaper war cannot 
subsequently come to the court as plaintiff to complain that he has had the worst of the 
fray."). This privilege includes the response that the plaintiff is a "liar" or that his prior 
statements were "lies." See, Gregory, 591 F. Supp. at 156; Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 594 Comment k at 267 (1977); Prosser and Keeton § 115 at 825; see also 
Foretich v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 37 F.3d 1541, 1562 (4th Cir. 1994). 
In this case, as a matter of law, all of the alleged defamatory statements were 
made by Overson in direct response to earlier attacks committed by Mast and CTU. 
For example, all of the alleged defamatory statements came after the full-page 
newspaper ad accusing Overson of illegal and unethical conduct by misleading the 
public and conducting "secret meetings." (R. at 184.) Oversows statement that the ad 
contained "bare-faced lies" is a direct response to the ad, and is the kind of response 
which has repeatedly been held to be privileged self-defense. See, Gregory, 591 F. 
Supp. at 156; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 594 comment k at 267; Prosser and 
Keeton § 115 at 825. Oversows statement that Concerned Taxpayers of Utah was a 
"ruse" is likewise a direct response to the prior attacks made by Mast and the CTU. 
Mast was bringing these charges to the public under the name of Concerned Taxpayers 
of Utah without disclosing that he himself was a real estate developer with a personal 
pecuniary interest in the dispute. As a matter of self-defense, Overson clearly had the 
right to bring this to the public's attention. Finally, the full-page ad titled "The Salt Lake 
County Golf Program Presents The Facts" was clearly an attempt by all of those who 
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signed it to set the facts straight and defend the actions of Salt Lake County and 
Commissioner Overson. (R. at 189.) 
The uncontroverted record, therefore, establishes that all allegedly defamatory 
statements were made by Overson in self-defense, and are thus privileged as a matter 
of law. 
b. Overson did not Abuse the Privilege through Malice or 
Excessive Publication, and, Therefore the Plaintiffs Claim 
Must Fail as a Matter of Law. 
Unlike the absolute privileges discussed previously, the privilege of self defense 
is a qualified privilege which can be defeated upon a showing of malice or excessive 
publication on the part of the defendant. See, Brehanvv. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49, 
58 (Utah 1991). In order to defeat a claim of qualified immunity, the Plaintiff must show 
"common law malice" rather than the constitutional "actual malice." Brehanv. 812 P.2d 
at 59. Common law malice is a term which denotes "personal hostility" or "ill will." id. 
To prove common law malice, Mast must show that Overson published the words with 
"an improper motive such as a desire to do harm," or that he "did not honestly believe 
his statements to be true " Oqden Bus Lines v. KSL Inc.. 551 P.2d 222, 225 (Utah 
1976). 
In the absence of proof that a communication was published with actual malice, 
"it is within the power and duty of the courts to say, as a matter of law, that the motive 
of the publication was without malice." Oqden Bus Lines. 551 P.2d at 225. Therefore, 
in these circumstances, the question of malice can be determined as a matter of law. 
In this case, the uncontroverted record establishes, as a matter of law, that Overson did 
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not act maliciously in defending himself. In view of the indisputable context in which 
Overson's statements were made, it would be impossible for Mast to show that Overson 
acted with malice. First of all, the uncontroverted record clearly shows that all of 
Oversows statements were made in good faith belief as to their truth. Overson referred 
to statements made in CTU's full-page advertisement as "bare-faced lies." (R. at 187.) 
The uncontroverted record shows that Overson did have a good faith basis for believing 
that several statements in the ad were in fact false. For example, CTU's ad claimed 
that Overson was disregarding state law by refusing to turn over disclosure statements 
and campaign contributions. (R. at 184.) In fact, indisputable evidence supports 
Oversows good faith belief that the county did in fact give Mast and CTU Oversows 
Campaign Finance Disclosure Statements. (R. at 178.) Furthermore, CTU's 
advertisement stated that Overson was misleading the public that the County would 
own the golf course property and that the property was included in the $7.9 million 
purchase price. (R. at 184.) Once again, indisputable evidence supports a good faith 
belief on the part of Commissioner Overson that this statement was in fact false. The 
real estate purchase contract for the South Mountain project itself states: "Purchase 
price to include 248 (more or less) acres of land as described by attached survey 
provided by Seller, but not less than the total acreage needed for the golf course." 
(R. at 148.) Finally, CTU's ad charged Overson with violating state law by meeting 
many times secretly and behind closed doors with South Mountain developers. (R. at 
184.) Once again, this statement was in fact false. Judge Medley's dismissal, of which 
this Court can take judicial notice, shows that Overson never violated the Utah open 
meetings laws. (R. at 179-180.) In light of the uncontroverted record in this case, Mast 
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cannot possibly show malice on the part of Overson. This Court can and should find as 
a matter of law that he did not act maliciously in this case. See, Gregory v. Durham 
County Board of Education, 591 F. Supp. 145, 156-157 (M.D.N.C. 1984); Rodriguez -
Erdmann v. Ravenswood Hospital Medical Center, 545 N.E. 2d 979, 985 (III. Ct. App. 
1989); Phifer v. Foe. 443 P.2d 870, 872 (Wyo. 1968). 
Likewise, the uncontroverted record establishes as a matter of law, that Overson 
did not "excessively publish" the allegedly defamatory statements. To avoid excessive 
publication, reply "must reasonably focus on the audience which heard the attack." 
Foretich v. Capital Cities/ABC. Inc.. 37 F.3d 1541, 1563 (4th Cir. 1994). In this case, 
Mast and CTU initiated attacks on Overson with articles and advertisements in the Salt 
Lake Tribune and the Deseret News, letters to the other Salt Lake County 
Commissioners and the Salt Lake County Attorney, and formal charges made before 
the Third District Court and the Utah Attorney General's Office. Overson replied to this 
attack with statements appearing in the same two newspapers. Overson showed great 
restraint in limiting his replies directly to contradicting Mast's and CTU's previous 
attacks. Overson did not delve into irrelevant aspects of Mast's private life. Overson 
instead "targeted [his] message toward those persons in whose eyes [his] reputation 
already had been (or soon would be) sullied." Foretich. 37 F.3d at 1563. 
Therefore, the uncontroverted record clearly establishes that Overson did not 
abuse his qualified privilege of self-defense, and thus this ourt should uphold the trial 
court's grant of Summary Judgment. 
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5. The Court Should Uphold the Trial Court's Grant of Summary 
Judgment Because any Allegedly Defamatory Statements are 
Subject to a Qualified Privilege Due to the Fact that They were Made 
to Protect a Legitimate Interest of Overson. 
a. Any Statements Made by Overson in this Case were Made to 
Protect his Legitimate Interests, and thus Enjoy a Qualified 
Privilege. 
Apart from the personal privilege of self-defense, defendants in defamation 
actions also enjoy a qualified privilege for defamatory statements made to protect their 
own legitimate interests. See, Gregory v. Durham County Board of Education, 591 F. 
Supp. 145, 156 (M.D.N.C. 1984). Utah has expressly recognized this privilege through 
both case law and statute. See, Brehanv v. Nordstrom, 812 P.2d 49, 58 (Utah 1991); 
Utah Code Ann. § 45-2-3(3). 
The same arguments that apply to the self defense privilege apply with equal 
force to the privilege to protect one's legitimate interests. Overson certainly had the 
right to protect his interests by responding directly to Mast's attacks, and thus he has a 
qualified privilege for all of his alleged defamatory statements. 
b. Overson Did Not Abuse the Privilege Through Malice or 
Excessive Publication, and Therefore, the Plaintiffs Claim 
Must Fail as a Matter of Law. 
As discussed previously in partX.C.4.b. of this brief, the uncontroverted record 
establishes, as a matter of law, that Overson did not abuse this privilege through acts of 
malice or excessive publication. This Court should, therefore, uphold the trial court's 
grant of summary judgment in favor of Overson. 
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6. The Court Should Uphold the Trial Court's Grant of Summary 
Judgment Because any Alleged Defamatory Statements were Made 
Regarding a Matter of "Public Interest" and Thus Overson Enjoys a 
Qualified Privilege for Such Statements. 
a. The Alleged Defamatory Statements Made by the Defendant 
are Subject to a Qualified Privilege Because They were Made 
Regarding a Matter of Public Interest. 
Utah has long recognized a qualified privilege against defamation liability for 
statements made concerning issues of "public interest." Seeqmillerv. KSL Inc., 626 
P.2d 968, 978 (Utah 1981); Qqden Bus Lines v. KSL. Inc.. 551 P.2d 222, 224 (Utah 
1976). This privilege applies regardless of whether or not the defendant is a member of 
the news media. See Ogden Bus Lines, 551 P.2d at 224. In defining what constitutes 
sufficient "public interest" for the privilege to apply, the Utah Supreme Court has stated: 
The 'public interest' privilege is applicable, at least, when public health 
and safety are involved and where there is a legitimate issue with respect 
to the functioning of governmental bodies, officials, or public institutions or 
with respect to matters involving the expenditure of public funds. 
Seeqmiller, 626 P.2d at 978. All of the alleged statements in this case arose directly 
out of the Salt Lake County's proposed acquisition of the South Mountain Golf Course. 
Both Mast and CTU publicly accused Commissioner Overson of improper use of public 
funds and unlawful and unethical behavior as a County Commissioner. (R. at 184-188.) 
All of Overson's statements were direct replies to these attacks and were aimed at 
ensuring the public that there was nothing illegal or improper with the proposed South 
Mountain project. Commissioner Overson's statements were clearly made in 
connection with a matter of "public interest" and are thus subject to a qualified privilege. 
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b. Overson Did Not Abuse the Privilege Through Malice or 
Excessive Publication, and Therefore, the Plaintiffs Claim 
Must Fail as a Matter of Law. 
As discussed previously in partX.CAb of this brief, the uncontroverted record 
establishes, as a matter of law, that Overson did not abuse this privilege through acts of 
malice or excessive publication. This Court should, therefore, uphold the lower court's 
grant of summary judgment for Overson. 
7. This Court Should Uphold the Trial Court's Grant of Summary 
Judgment Because, Under the U.S. Constitution, as a Public Figure, 
Mast has not Sustained, and as a Matter of Law Cannot Sustain, his 
Burden of Proving that Overson's Statements are Both False and 
Made with Actual Malice. 
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution places limits on the ability 
of a plaintiff to recover for defamation when that plaintiff is considered to be a "public 
figure." First of all, a public figure bears the burden of proving that the alleged 
defamatory statements are actually false. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 
U.S. 767, 775-776 (1986). Second, as a public figure, plaintiff also bears the burden of 
proving that the alleged defamatory statements were made with "actual malice." Gertz 
v. Robert Welch. Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 334-337 (1974). If the Plaintiff fails to demonstrate 
a genuine issue of material fact on either of these two issues, then his cause of action 
must fail as a matter of law. See, Fram, 380 F. Supp. at 1338; Beard v. Baum, 796 
P.2d 1344, 1353 (Alaska 1990); Rodriquez-Erdmann, 545 N.E.2d at 985. 
a. Mast is a Public Figure for the Purpose of Application of the 
First Amendment to this Defamation Action. 
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It is unquestionable, given the circumstances of this case, that the Plaintiff is a 
"public figure" for purposes of this defamation action. In regards to this issue, the 
United States Supreme Court has stated: 
In some instances an individual may achieve such pervasive fame or 
notoriety that he becomes a public figure for all purposes and in all 
contexts. More commonly, an individual voluntarily injects himself oris 
drawn into a particular public controversy and thereby becomes a public 
figure for a limited rage of issues. 
Gertz. 418 U.S. at 351. The Court also described the public figure as someone who 
"thrusts" himself" into the vortex of [a] public issue." Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352. Since the 
South Mountain acquisition was undeniably a "public controversy," and since Mast 
voluntarily thrust himself into the vortex of that issue, then, as a matter of law, Mast is a 
"public figure" for the purposes of this case. 
i. The debate over the South Mountain acquisition is 
undeniably a "public controversy." 
A "public controversy" is a dispute that in fact has received public attention 
because its ramifications will be felt by persons who are not direct participants. 
Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications. Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 1296 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert, 
denied. 449 U.S. 898 (1980). "If the issue was being debated publicly, and if it had 
foreseeable and substantial ramifications for non-participants, it was a public 
controversy." ]d. 627 F.2d at 1297. Under this criteria, it is undeniable that the South 
Mountain issue was a "public controversy" for constitutional purposes. 
ii. Mast voluntarily thrust himself into the vortex of this 
public controversy. 
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Once the court has defined the controversy, it must analyze Mast's role in it. 
Waldbaum. 627 F.2d at 1297. Mast either must have been purposefully trying to 
influence the outcome or could realistically have been expected, because of his position 
in the controversy, to have an impact on its resolution. ]d. 627 F.2d at 1297. With this 
standard in mind, it is absolutely clear that Mast "thrust" himself into the "vortex" of the 
South Mountain controversy. 
David K. Mast is known throughout the community as someone who continually 
"thrusts" himself into public controversy. An October 28, 1996 article in the Deseret 
News reported that Mast has "publicly challenged the likes of the Utah Sports Authority, 
the Utah Transit Authority, Micron, Salt Lake County, the City of Draper and even the 
National Basketball Association." (R. at 80.) The same article quoted Mast as saying: 
"I just feel I'm in a position that I cannot only say something about an issue but I can do 
something about it. I have money. I can put ads in papers. I can litigate if I have to." 
(]d.) The ad referred to Mast as "the Lawsuit-man," and stated that Mast has lost track 
of how many lawsuits he's filed in his lifetime. (]d.) 
From the early stages of the South Mountain proposal, Mast was a vocal 
opponent who did not shy away from making his opinions known in the press. 
Numerous cases have held that a person becomes a public figure when they bring an 
issue to the public attention by going to the press. See, Morgan v. Tice. 862 F.2d 1495, 
1496 (11th Cir. 1989) (public figure plaintiff had criticized the defendant repeatedly, both 
verbally and as a writer of a weekly column in a local newspaper); Fram v. Yellow Cab 
Co. of Pittsburgh, 380 F. Supp. 1314, 1334 (W.D. Pa. 1974) ("Fram intentionally sought 
the press and the media to publicize his criticism of Yellow Cab's rate increase. Fram's 
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activities qualify him as a public figure under Gertz."); Beard v. Baum. 796 P.2d 1344, 
1353 (Alaska 1990); Rodriquez-Erdmann v. Ravenswood Hospital Medical Center. 545 
N.E. 2d 979, 985 (III. Ct. App. 1989). 
It is unquestionable Mast was publicly trying to influence the outcome of the 
South Mountain debate. Given these facts, Mast is clearly a "public figure" for purposes 
of this case, and he, therefore, has the burden of proving both falsity and actual malice. 
b. Mast has not Satisfied, and as a Matter of Law Cannot Satisfy, 
His Burden of Proving that Overson's Statements Were False. 
As discussed above, Mast, as a public figure, has the burden of proving that 
Overson's statements were false. Since all of the statements made by Overson are 
either pure opinion or are undeniably true, as a matter of law, it is impossible for Mast to 
meet his constitutionally required burden. 
First of all, Overson's statements are matters of pure opinion and thus, as a 
matter of law, can not be proven false. See, Supra, Part X.C.3. of this brief. 
Furthermore, while Overson is quoted as saying that CTU's August 22 full-page ad 
contained "bare-faced lies," as a matter of clear indisputable fact, CTU's full-page ad 
did contain several falsities. See, Supra, Part X.CAb of this brief. As such is the case, 
it is impossible, as a matter of law, for Mast to satisfy his burden of proving actual 
falsity. 
c. Mast has not Satisfied, and as a Matter of Law Cannot Satisfy, 
his Burden of Proving that Overson Made the Alleged 
Statements with Actual Malice. 
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Since Mast is clearly a public figure, he has the burden of proving that Overson 
made the alleged defamatory statements with "actual malice," i.e., knowing or reckless 
falsity. See, Gertz, 418 U.S. at 334-337. Given the above arguments that Overson's 
statements are actually true, it is certainly clear beyond any doubt that Overson made 
his statements with good faith and reasonable belief in their truth. In light of the 
evidence above, it would be impossible for Mast to show that Overson made his 
statements with knowing or reckless falsity. 
8. The Court Should Grant Overson's Motion for Summary Judgment 
Because he is Immune from this Suit Under the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act. 
a. Mast's Exclusive Remedy in this Case is Filing Suit under the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act provides the exclusive remedy for a 
plaintiff who is injured by a governmental employee's act or omission that occurs 
"during the performance of the employee's duties within the scope of employment, or 
under color of authority." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-4(3)(a). Such a plaintiff may not 
bring any other civil action based upon the same subject matter against the employee 
unless the employee acted or failed to act through fraud or malice. Utah Code Ann. § 
63-30-4(3)(b)(i). The alleged defamatory statements were clearly made by Overson 
during the performance of his duties, within the scope of his employment, or under the 
color of authority. It is a Salt Lake County Commissioner's statutory responsibility to 
purchase real property in the name of the County, (Utah Code Ann. § 17-5-242), and to 
expend County funds in a manner that the Commission deems advisable to carry out its 
duties (Utah Code Ann. § 17-5-271). Mast and CTU engaged in public attacks that 
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criticized the South Mountain plan and accused Overson of illegal and unethical 
behavior while acting as a County Commissioner. Overson's replies were narrowly 
tailored to a refutation of Mast's attacks and a defense of the County's conduct with 
regard to the South Mountain proposal. The full-page advertisement titled "THE 
FACTS" was duly authorized and signed by all three Salt Lake County Commissioners, 
the Mayor of Draper City, the County Parks Board Chair, and the County Golf Advisory 
Chair. This conduct was clearly within the scope of Overson's employment as a County 
Commissioner. See, egu, Fender v. City of Oregon City, 811 F. Supp. 554, 558 (D. Or. 
1993), affd, 37 F.3d 1505 (9th Cir. 1994)(dealing with common law executive privilege); 
Schroeder v. Poaqe. 707 P.2d 1240, 1243 (Or. Ct. App. 1985) (dealing with common 
law executive privilege). 
As discussed in previous sections, the circumstances surrounding this case, and 
the uncontroverted record before the Court, show as a matter of law that Commissioner 
Overson's statements were made in self defense, and with a reasonable belief that 
such statements were true. See, Supra, Part X.C.4 of this brief. Thus, as a matter of 
law, there was no malice on the part of Overson. See, Gregory v. Durham County 
Board of Education. 591 F. Supp. 145, 156-157 (M.D.N.C. 1984). 
Therefore, Mast's sole remedy in this case is an action brought under the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act 
b. Under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, the Defendant is 
Absolutely Immune from this Lawsuit. 
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Under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, "no employee may be held 
personally liable for acts or omissions occurring during the performance of the 
employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority, unless it 
is established that the employee acted or failed to act due to fraud or malice." Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-30-4(4). 
As discussed above, the uncontroverted record establishes, as a matter of law, 
that there was no fraud or malice on the part of Overson. Therefore, as a matter of law, 
Overson is absolutely immune from liability. 
XI. CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment in favor of the defendant-appellee, Brent Overson. 
DATED: April j 0 , 1998. 
BERMAN, GAUFIN, TOMSIC & SAVAGE 
Jay D. Gurmankin 
Richard D. Flint 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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CONCERNED TAXPAYERS OF UTAH 
"a non profit organization" 
February 22, 1996 
Salt Lake County Commissioner "ViarFax 468-3535" 
Brent Ovcrson 
Suite #N2100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190 
Dear Brent 
1 keep missing you by telephone* I believe you'll remember me from are past meetings concerning Salt 
County's attempt to contractually require pre-determincd wages and benofits in the renovation of the Sak Palace 
Convention Center of which, like our group, you strongly opposed. See attached complaint 
We understand that you and fellow commissioner, Randy Horiuchi are pursuing a deal using Utah Taxpayers 
money in which the County would purchase property in Draper from a local developer/contractor, South 
Mountain Development, for approximately 13 million dollars. Then in turn, contract with the same 
contractor/developer to construct a golf course and club house at an amount DOUBLE what we believe the 
costs should be. 
For your information, the golf course South Mountain has represented and started construction on is aTarget" 
type golf course due to the unbuiklable terrain. In other words, a golf course with little fairway between tee 
boxes and greens, therefore costing less to build! 
In the interest of the Utah Taxpayer, we suggest the following: 
1. Obtain an independent appraisal for the golf course property South Mountain intends to sell the County. 
2. Request at least two public meeting to discuss the purchase price of the property South Mountain wants to 
sell to the County. 
3. With the blessing of the Utah Taxpayer, there should be a condition placed upon the purchase of the South 
Mountain property, that being the construction of the golf course and club house be competently hid! 
Another concern we have is, several months ago a number of our members seen you on the local news program 
wearing a "South Mountain" golf shirt. Is it possible you have a conflict of interest regarding this matter? 
Please advise. 
Finally, be advised, our group would not hesitate filing a lawsuit against the County if you, and your fellow 
Commissioners wants to perform without the best interest of the Utah Taxpayer*; Please govern yourselves 
accordingly. 
David K. 
Chairman 
Concerned Taxpayers of Utah 
cncl. ^00S6 
cc: County Commissioner, Randy Horiuchi ^n ^ 
County Commissioner, Mary Callaghan 
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CONCERNED TAXPAYERS OF UTAH 
aa oon profit organization" 
February 26,1996 
Salt Lake County Commissioner "Via Fax 468-3535rt 
Randy Horiuchi 
Suite #N2100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190 
Re: Draper Golf Course Property 
Dear Randy: 
I believe you to be in receipt ofxny letter of February 22,1996, see attached, sent to fellow Salt Lake 
County Commissioner, Brent Oversou - and from that letter you should know our concern about your 
dealings with South Mountain Development 
For you to accept front row seating basketball tickets, costing hundreds of dollars from South 
Mountain Developer, Terry Diehl, gives our group the impression you ate being induced by the same 
developer the County is dealing with concerning its acquisition of die Draper golf course property in 
tiie control of South Mountain Development 
Like Commissioner Brent Overson, wc are concerned that you may have (among other things) a 
conflict of interest and cannot now deal in clean hands with South Mountain and in the best interest of 
the Utah Taxpayer, However, perhaps you were unaware of pending matters affecting South 
Mountain when you accepted the gift 
Presentiy, we would like to know what the County's intent is with South Mountain and its golf course 
property. Does the County intend on dealing with them privately or in the open? Furthermore, does 
the County intend for the public to competitively bid on the construction of the golf course, club house 
and maintenance building • or just give that work to back to South Mountain forjwhat may be an 
exorbitant price at the expense of the Utah Taxpayer? Please advise. 
Sincerely, 
DavidlCMast J 
Chairman / 
Concerned Taxpayers of Utah 
encl. 
cc: Salt Lake County Attorney, Douglas Short -via fioc-468-2622 A0055 
County Commissioner, Brent Overson 
County Commissioner, Mary Callaghan / I 
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* C County 
vi>iay Buy 
rDraper Course 
' • Continued from B-l 
.site aa beautiful, challenging and 
a good price because land is in-
'eluded. It also Alls a golf need in 
the southeast part of the county 
"He .has no idea what he's talk-
ling about," Overson says, "It's not 
like the commissioners went out 
;and cut a deal." 
4'Overton sari the county sub-
mitted two other possible sites lo 
'lis Golf Advisory and Parka and 
* Recreation boards and both rec-
ommended the South Mountain 
site. 
And competitive bids were nev-
er rui option, says Terry Diehl a 
partner with Dee Christiansen in 
the 1,700-home South Mountain 
project Right now, the course is 
60% complete snd it should open 
in toe spring at ivvt, ne i ^ , 
'The county came to i V w c 
said the only way we'd dc tm a 
turnkey basis/* says Dieiu. 4*urn-
key is developer parlance for a 
project sold when it is finished 
and ready to operate. They fear, 
another developer* might no^ > 
build the course in harmony withJ 
the rest of the project 
"We'll take care. Well have a 
much more conscientious ap-
proach in looking after the whole 
mountain, not just the golf 
course," Dlehl says. 
A clubhouse is not included In 
the sale to the county because 
South Mountain wants a commer- -
cul center that would include a 
clubhouse with cart storage, a 60*" 
b§d bed Mad breakfast, a restau-
rant with banquet facilities and 50 
townhouse condominiums, 
Diehi defends the "target", 
style course as being environmen-
tally sensitive. And hitting drives . 
over ravines and scrub oak will, 
challenge golfers on a course that 
has a magnificent view of the Salt' 
Lake Valley. 
**lt keeps you from disturbing 
the whole mountain and there's a 
lot less maintenance, he says. 
"And instead of planting 276 
acres with grass, we'll only plant 
90." 
Lynn Larsen is project manag-
er for the county's golf courses. 
He says the South Mountain 
course is a good deal for the coun-
ty, its taxpayers and golfers. Com-
bined with the county's new 
course in Rlverton, the count* 
fills golfers' needs in the south 
county. 
But building a golfcourse for 
$3.5 million is impossible these 
days. The Rlverton course cost $6 
million and the Old Mill course, 
where construction has just be-
gun, will cost about $11.5 million, 
Larsen adds. 
Draper residents should be 
happy for the county to take over 
the course, says Councilvrom.ni 
Melanie Danaie, who normally an-
guiahes over the growth up the 
mountainside. 
"My only concern is making 
sure it remains an open space/* 
she says. "When Terry and Dec 
presented the plan, it could well 
have been the Sierra Club." 
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CONCERNED TAXPAYERS OF UTAH 
aa non profit organization" 
March 4, 1996 
Salt Lake County Commissioner 
Brent Overson 
Suite #N2100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190 
Re: Draper Golf Course Property 
Registered Letter 
RECEIVED 
MAR 0 a b a o 
COMMISSIONER OVERSON 
Dear Commissioner Overson: 
In response to your comment I read in Saturday's, Salt Lake Tribune, reported by Jon Ure, see attached. 
You were quoted as saying... "He has no idea what he's talking about". Respectfully, since we believe that 
you are the one who does not know what he is talking about concerning the "target golf course being 
proposed in Draper, may we suggest you schedule a public meeting to hear public comment concerning this 
issue. That way at least, it will not appear as though you have something to hide! 
If what you say is true, that the County is receiving a golf course at., "a good price becawe the land is 
included"...then why is a target golf course that would cost much less than 4 million dollars a good price at 
8 million dollars (without a clubhouse) such a good deal? Do you think your fellow Commissioners also 
believe the land cost in Draper is not included in the 8 million dollar price to build the golf course and do 
think they know that this golf course property is required to be dedicated to Draper City as "open space"? 
For your information, we are not opposed to the County's desire to fund more user friendly, self sufficient 
golf courses in the valley. Golf courses that are not two months less seasonable because of northern 
exposure, at higher elevations and undesirable to intermediate and lady golfers. However, we are opposed 
to secret deals made behind closed doors to purchase a less than desirable "target type" golf course without 
public notice, scrutiny, and competitive bid process etc. All of which promotes waste in government 
spending. Simply put, it would not be a good deal for the County to burden the taxpayers with a golf course 
that would require subsidy from profitable golf courses. May we given the opportunity to prove our claim? 
Finally, if you would like to avoid a lawsuit from our organization and truly care about the opinion of the 
Utah Taxpayer, then we suggest at a minimum, the County hold public meetings concerning this matter, 
then we will see who has no idea what he is talking about Will you accept the challenge? Please advise. 
Sincerely, sincerely, s 
David K. Mast ) 
President /s 
Concerned Taxpayers of Utah 
encl. 
cc: Salt Lake County Commissioner, Randy Horiuchi - via fax - 468-3535 
Salt Lake County Commissioner, Mary Callaghan - via fax - 468-3535 
Salt Lake County Attorney, Douglas Short - via fax - 468-2622 
A 0 0 5 8 
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CONCERNED TAXPAYERS OF UTAH 
"a non profit orglnlzatlou,, 
March 15,1996 
Salt Lake County Commissioner "Via Fax 46S-3535*' 
Brent Oversoti 
Suite #N2100 
Salt Lake City, Utah S4190 
Dear Brent: 
I am in your receipt of your February 21,1996 letter post marked March 8,1996. In response to your letter, 
please be advised of the following* 
Contrary to your comment.. "Salt Lake County was approached by Draper City ami South Mountain 
Development"L. Terry Diehl of South Mountain Development is quoted as saying... "Salt Lake County 
approached South Mountain and Draper City"— concerning the Draper Golf Course. So we are not sure who 
we should believe Mr. Overson, and soli are wondering why Salt Lake County wants to spend up to 13 million 
dollars for a second-rate golf course that should cost less than 3 million dollars to construct 
In response to your statements "Golfers are literally paying for new courses to play on, and for major 
improvements to existing courses".* If your statement is true; when you factor in substandard golf courses 
that need subsidy to build, operate and maintain, the net result is unjust, ever inereasmg golf fees. T_ suspect it 
w*« ihnt type nf thinking font ceased the thnost 100% increase m golf fee* since 1989 In Other words, if the 
golf courses are self supporting then why the increase m golf fees? Nonetheless, we are pleased to learn from 
your letter, before Salt Lake County will consider purchasing the Draper Golf Course, [the County] ...%>*// 
ultimately be open to the scrutiny of three-quarters of a milium residents in Salt Lake County".- Thank you 
for sharing mat information with us and we will plan accordingly. 
For your files, I have attached literature from a top ten golf course design group,44Arthur Hill**- Included are 
costs estimates and actual costs to build a "higLsid" 13 hole golf course, which if you average 95 and 96 costs 
amounts to $3,452,031. Again, be advised, a "target type" golf course will cost much, much less* 
I am going to have our attorney contact County Attorney, Douglas Short to find out the amount the County is 
budgetmg for the Draper Golf Course. If that amount for the golf course (including the maintenance facilities) 
exceeds 3 millions dollars, then we will be filing a lawsuit immediately. We understand that the real property 
for the Draper Golf Course ts required to be donated from a pool of dedicated open space belonging to Draper 
City. Furthermore, the club house will be privately financed, built, owned and operated by South Mountain 
Development, and therefore should MQ1 be a part of the funding. 
Sincerely, 
David KJ 
Chairman 
Concerned Taxpayers of Utah 
cncls, 
cc: County CotnmisMorieT, Rainfy 
County Commissioner, Mary Cailaghan 
Salt Lake County Attorney, Douglas Short 
4777 COMMERCE DRIVE<. MURRAY, UTAH - M107 - (SOI) 2«-0420-FAX(B0i)2«-1377 
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County may be sued over golf-course data 
ByZackVanEyck 
Deseret News staff writer 
Concerned Taxpayers of Utah is 
threatening to go back to court to 
force Salt Lake County to release 
cost estimates for the Draper golf 
course the county may purchase. 
If the county decides to buy the 
18-hole South Mountain course, 
the nonprofit organization might 
also amend its March 28 lawsuit 
and ask that a 3rd District Court judge require the county to put 
construction of the golf course 
through the competitive bid pro-
cess. 
David K. Mast, a Draper resi-
dent and chairman of the group, 
said the actions are being consid-
ered nowbecause the county re-
leased only a portion of the 
information the group requested 
through the Government Records 
Access and Management Act Af-
ter requesting two extensions on 
the group's request, Mast said the 
county finally turned over docu-
ments related to the golf course— 
but with the dollar amounts 
blacked out. 
Mast also is upset because none 
of the correspondence from South 
Mountain to county officials was 
released. Commissioner Randy 
Horiuchi said Monday the county 
still is considering whether to 
make the letters public. 
Mast contends the county could 
end up paying millions of dollars 
more than necessary for the course 
but said the public can't make that 
evaluation without the cost esti-
mates given to the county by South 
Mountain. 
• ^They're making a deal behind 
closed doors where it can't be scru-
tinized," Mast said. "(South Moun-
tain's developers) are saying, 4OK, 
we've got a great deal for you. 
We're going to donate the property 
but you will have to reimburse us 
between $8 and $12 million for the 
golf course' — a golf course that 
should cost only $3 to $4 million." 
. On Wednesday the Salt Lake 
County Recreation Board and the 
Golf Advisory Board will hold a 
joint public hearing on the pro-
posed acquisition of the South 
Mountain course. The hearing will 
begin at noon at Meadowbrook 
Golf Course, 4197 S. 1300 West in 
Murray. 
Terry Diehl, a South Mountain 
partner, said all communications 
would become part of the public 
record if the developers sign a deal 
with the county. South Mountain's 
Sartners want to donate the land to le county but have the county pay 
them to build the course, which 
Diehl said is now 65 percent. 
complete. 
"What we told the county is, 
'Until we have a signed contract, 
everything we give you is confiden-
tial and proprietary,'" Diehl said. 
"Let's say we don't sign a contract 
with the county and it doesn't go 
forward, we don't think all our 
stuf f should be public. 
"We're not trying to be difficult 
with Dave Mast or anybody in 
particular." 
Horiuchi said the county be-
lieves it can purchase the South 
Mountain course without going 
through a competitive bid process 
because it would be buying a com-
pleted course, not starting a 
project from scratch. 
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Suyiiig Draper Golf Course a Bad Deal, 
By Jon Ure 
THE 8ALT LAKE TRIBUNE 
A 20-year golf professional who 
uilds and operates courses 
laims Salt Lake County will rip 
ff taxpayers if it acquires an 18* 
tole, $8 million golf course on 
Paper's South Mountain. < 
' Jim Blair,: co-owner of Mulli-
;an's Golf and Games in Ogden 
md Riverton; said he will oppose 
he deal at a public hearing on the 
proposal today at noon in the* 
VIeadow Brook Golf Course club-
house! 4197 S.,1300 West. 
:
 He has Joined with Dave Mast, 
chairman of Concerned Taxpay-
er's .6f Utah, in opposing the pur-
chase. Both say, South Mountain's 
$8 million price tag is ridiculous, 
pmd by their reckoning, the coun-
ty^  should, pay rno, more, than $4 
M i l l i o n . • • ; . 
;;JMast's group has filed a lawsuit 
to prevent the transaction. He 
> 
o 
o 
said South Mountain's developers 
and the Salt Lake County Com-
mission are engaged in a sweet-
heart deal and complained that 
his freedom of information re-
quests for county and South 
Mountain documents regarding 
the proposed purchase are being 
• illegally thwarted. 
f/« The $8 million figure does not 
Include a clubhouse on the course 
. in the middle of South Mountain's 
* 1,700 residences. Blair and Mast 
said other golf courses in the 
. area, including those superior to 
South Mountain's, cost half that 
much. 
And if Sotith Mountain is donat-
ing the land, why will it cost the 
county the whole $8 million? 
asked Blair. Blair also wanted to 
know why the county should own 
and operate it. 
Terry Diehl, a partner in the 
South Mountain development, 
said Blair is upset because he 
can't sell his golf facility to the 
county. And South Mountain's 
correspondence with the county is 
confidential because a contract 
has yet to be signed, Diehl added. 
"Jimmy Blair doesn't know 
what he's talking about," Diehl 
said. "I'm sure he hasn't been up 
Says Golf Professional 
to the site. We're moving 2.5 mil-
lion yards of dirt and he knows we 
can't do it for what he's saying. • 
We've got this huge expense that 
you don't get on a flat golf course. 
"He just wants to sell his deal to 
the county,'! Diehl said. "That's 
the whole motivation." 
Blair acknowledged he would 
like to sell his 3-par golf course to 
the county, but the county has no 
need for it. He denies that his op-
position to the South Mountain 
deal involves ulterior motives. 
"I'm no competition at all," 
Blair said. "I'm a concerned tax-
payer and they're making a kill-
ing on this deal. People shouldn't 
be retiring on this. It makes no 
sense. That golf course is worth 
between $3 million and $4 mil-
lion.0 . 
He added that Jeremy Ranch 
sold three years ago for $3.2 mil-
lion with a clubhouse and Park 
Meadows sold four years ago for 
• $4.1 million. . 
Gleh Lu, director of Salt Lake 
County Recreation, defended the 
$8 million price tag. The Old Mill 
course, he noted, will cost around 
$11 million and that does not in-
clude some 30 acres of the land 
needed there. 
Salt Lake County Commission 
Chairman Brent Overson wants a 
public golf course in the area that 
will pay its way, perhaps become 
profitable and go easy on the sen-
sitive hillside. 
"It's not like the commissioners 
went out and cut a deal," Overson 
said. South Mountain's plan was 
picked from a list of three by the 
county's Golf Advisory Board. 
And since the county approached 
South Mountain, competitive bids 
were never even a notion, added 
Diehl. 
South Mountain also plans a 60-
bed bed and breakfast, a restau-
rant with banquet facilities and a 
clubhouse with cart storage! 
Some 50 townhouse condomini-
ums will also be built nearby. 
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Monday, October 28, 1996 
CO-FOUNDER OF TAXPAYERS GROUP USES MONEY, 
MIGHT AND LAWSUITS TO MAKE PUBLIC OFFICIALS 
TOE THE LINE 
By Zack Van Eyck, Staff Writer 
You've heard of the Answer Man? He's the Question Man. You're familiar with the Lawman? He's the 
Lawsuit-man. 
He's developer David K. Mast - wealthy, confident and just as likely to take legal action as he is to speak 
his mind, both of which he does often. He's been more than just a thorn in the side of some Utah public 
officials - more like a harpoon. And he's hardly apologetic. 
The 44-year-old Salt Lake County native, co-founder and chairman of Concerned Taxpayers of Utah, has 
publicly challenged the likes of the Utah Sports Authority, the Utah Transit Authority, Micron, Salt Lake 
County, the city of Draper and even the National Basketball Association. 
Most recently, Mast charged Draper City Councilman Lyn Kimball and Mayor Elaine Redd with conflicts 
of interest because they are buying lots in the South Mountain development. Kimball admitted a conflict 
and has since refrained from voting on South Mountain issues. 
Earlier this year, his group challenged the proposed county purchase of the South Mountain golf course, 
filing a lawsuit and placing a full-page ad in local papers. Mast accused Commission Chairman Brent 
Overson of breaking the law by holding secret meetings with South Mountain representatives. Overson 
called the allegations "misstatements and bare-faced lies." 
Mast regularly confronts the Draper City Council in public meetings. He said his willingness to take on 
City Hall has prompted "over 100 calls" from residents asking him to run for mayor next year, an idea he 
is considering. 
"They probably look at me as a radical," Mast said of city officials. "They feel uncomfortable around me 
because they know I will bring it to the residents of Draper's attention that they've made mistakes. 
" I just feel Pm in a position that I can not only say something about an issue but I can do something 
about it. I have money. I can put ads in papers. I can litigate if I have to." 
Mast, who has lost track of how many lawsuits he's filed in his lifetime, has already filed one suit against 
Draper this year and plans to file another. He said he began using litigation as a way to solve problems as 
a general contractor on military projects. Government staffers told him to work for a lesser fee, then sue 
to get what he should have been paid. He continues to rely on the legal system because it is the only way 
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to "know the whole story." 
Mast himself has been accused of distorting the facts and exaggerating, but even former adversaries 
respect him. Chuck Akerlow, who went to arbitration with Mast to settle a dispute about a road Akerlow 
hired him to build for the Centennial development, said Mast is "a very bright guy." 
"Whether you agree with his political views or not, he is at least a person who has the courage to express 
them and do something about them," Aker-low said. "He's good for this community. There needs to be 
more people who stand up and make public officials account for what they!re doing." 
Mast said his taxpayers organization has more than 100 members and is not simply a front for his own 
views, as Overson has asserted. He does fund most of the group's endeavors, however. 
And because Mast stands to make about $9 million from his Draper Heights subdivision, the group's 
efforts aren't likely to subside. And Mast wouldn't have much trouble funding a mayoral campaign. 
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